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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines immigration’s political effects in Europe over the past several 
decades. In many countries, immigrants are not integrating well. One result is the 
growing political strength of nationalist right-wing parties. Tensions have risen between 
those immigrants who refuse to adopt European values and European natives who 
consider their identity to be at risk. European governments have essentially two methods 
by which to control the impact of immigration—they can limit the number of legal 
immigrants and/or they can insist on integration. This thesis makes the case that 
integration is key to preventing further political strife over immigration policies in 
Europe. By examining the performance of immigrant integration policies across twelve 
European countries, we identify shortfalls and argue on behalf of the need for a standard 
European Union approach to measure integration performance.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
According to politicians in most European countries, immigrants will seek 
economic opportunity and political protection in Europe for decades to come. To an 
extent, this fills a need in Europe for labor. But the integration of these immigrants is 
proving more difficult than the politicians had planned. In May 2012,  
David Cameron, Britain’s PM, launched a scathing attack earlier this 
months on 30 years of multiculturalism in Britain warning that it fostered 
extremism. His damning verdict came just months after German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel said that multiculturalism in Germany had 
failed. Now Sarkozy has joined the growing number of European leaders 
who have adopted identical views on multiculturalism.1 
Several studies show increasing problems with integrating many immigrants into 
European society, and the solution is far from easy. The concept of integration is vaguely 
defined across Europe. In this study, we will develop the concept of integration at length. 
Integration will be defined as equal participation in the political, social, economic and 
cultural spheres of life.2  Some politicians maintain that integration will eventually 
happen over time and the population will coalesce eventually. Studies and events in 
Europe suggest that native Europeans are far from happy with immigration and the 
governments’ immigration and integration policies. In France, the UK, Holland, Germany 
and the Scandinavian countries, a growing undercurrent of tension exists toward 
immigrants and the governments’ failure to integrate them. A report from the Directorate 
of Integration and Diversity in Norway, published in 2009, states, “Around half of the 
population believes that integration is not working well. Those who believe that 
integration is failing miserably make up only a small part of the population, but this 
group is steadily growing; from 6 per cent in 2005 to 12 percent in 2009.”3 The same 
tendencies can be seen in reports across Europe.  
                                                 
1 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355961/Nicolas-Sarkozy-joins-David-Cameron-Angela-
Merkel-view-multiculturalism-failed.html, 14 May 2012. 
2 Martiniello, Marco, “Towards a coherent approach to immigrant integration policy(ies) in the 
European Union,” www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/38295165.pdf 
3 IMDi-report 4–2010 Integration barometer 2009 
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“Immigration is unlikely to abate in the near future. Confronting declining fertility 
rates, ailing pension systems, and pressing labor markets, advanced industrialized 
economies provide the pull factors that drive international migration, while economic 
hardship and political unrest in less developed countries furnish the necessary push 
factor.”4 The history of migration to Europe goes back to the post World War period. 
During World War II Europe lost a large percentage of its working force that has had 
long lasting consequences on its labor force. Colonial powers then turned to their 
colonies for this manpower. “France imported labor from Algeria, the British from South 
Asian countries and the Germans from Turkey.”5 These male immigrant workers lived in 
inexpensive, crowded lodgings. Frequently they traveled back to their home country to 
visit family, but returned to Europe to work. After a quarter of century immigrants in 
Europe were encouraged to return home when Europe suffered the effect of the 1978 oil 
price shock which dried up employment opportunities.6 Governments then tightened 
immigration policies, but the immigrants didn’t want to leave due to even worse 
economic conditions at home. Many European countries then applied rules that 
encouraged family reunification. This resulted in the workers wanting to bring their 
families to Europe. This overall failure to tighten immigration led to an explosion in 
immigration in the ‘70s and ‘80s into Europe.7 These new immigrant families demanded 
mosques and schools. European governments then started implementing different 
integration policies. The results of these social experiments can be found “in the many 
immigrant neighborhoods, surrounding major cities, declared “no-go” zones by the local 
police.”8 Problems can be seen in the Paris suburbs, in pockets of immigrants in England 
who are in direct opposition to the state, and in German third generation immigrants who 
convert to Salafi Islam. All are the result of failed integration policies.9 No European 
country has developed a good integration policy and some have even turned their back on 
                                                 
4 Immigration and Conflict in Europe. Rafaela M. Dancygier, 2010, Cambridge University Press 
5 Sageman, M. Leaderless Jihad, 2008, 99 
6 Ibid, 99 
7 Ibid, 100 
8 Ibid, 103 
9 Ibid, 102–103 
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the issue with wishful thinking that it might solve itself. The flow of immigrants to 
Europe is steadily increasing. Here are a few examples of the European immigration 
flow.10 
• Italy: 254,000 immigrants in 2006 and 424,000 immigrants in 2010.  
• The Netherlands: 67,000 immigrants in 2006 and 110,000 immigrants in 2010 
• Germany: 558,000 immigrants in 2006 and 683,000 immigrants in2010 
• Denmark: 24,000 immigrants in 2006 and 33,000 immigrants in 2010. 
Today, as in the ‘70s and ‘80s, European governments still lack a sufficient policy 
to integrate new immigrants. This failure leads to a division among citizens in many 
European countries. Both integrated immigrants and locals express hostility toward 
immigrants and governments over integration and immigration policies. Since 2005, 
many countries’ European nationalistic and right-wing parties have gained strength in 
response to these failed policies. The values and cultural norms between locals, 
immigrants and the government are diverging.  
This thesis will examine the potential for latent divisions over values and cultural 
norms to give rise to political disorder. What effect do immigration and integration 
policies have on political order? How can a government influence the immigration and 
integration process to maintain order?   
The following events in Europe highlight the growing tension between 
immigrants, locals, and governments over the past decade. 
A. 2004: THE KILLING OF FILM DIRECTOR THEO VAN GOGH IN 
HOLLAND. 
Theo van Gogh was a Dutch filmmaker. He worked together with the Somali-
born writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali to produce a film that criticized the treatment of women in 
Islam. The film aroused controversy among Muslims and, in November 2004, a Dutch-
Moroccan Muslim assassinated van Gogh. Implanted in van Gogh’s body with a knife, 
the assassin left a five-page note threatening Western countries. Van Gogh’s murder led 
                                                 
10 OECD Migration Database 
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to a series of protests and marches by Dutch citizens outraged over the death.11 “At the 
same time, starting with four attempted arson attacks on mosques on the weekend of 5–7 
November, numerous apparently retaliatory violent incidents and arson attacks took place 
against Muslim targets. The Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
recorded a total of 106 violent incidents in November against Muslim targets.”12 
B. 2005: RIOTS IN THE SUBURBS OF PARIS. 
“The death of two teenagers in 2005 set suburban France ablaze by immigrant 
youth. Despite government promises to invest in the run-down estates, little has changed 
at Clichy-sous-Bois, the focal point of the 2005 riots.”13 In 2007 new riots started again 
in the immigrant district when two North African kids were killed by the police. 
Immigrants in the suburbs demand equal rights and accused the police of racism. Jeffrey 
Reitz, a University of Toronto sociology professor who studies ethnicity and 
immigration, offered this explanation for the Paris riots, “It’s not the immigrants, but 
their children, who are a very different group of people.” Reitz says that, in general, when 
immigrants compare the situation in their adopted country to the life they left behind, 
they usually find things are better, even if they are discriminated against. If things don’t 
improve, they often have the option of returning home. “The second generation can’t go 
back as easily and have been told in school they should be treated equally. When it 
doesn’t happen, there’s disappointment,” Reitz said.14 
C. 2005: PRINTING OF THE MUHAMMAD CARTOONS IN JYLLANDS 
POSTEN NEWSPAPER, DENMARK. 
In September 2005, one of Denmark’s biggest newspapers printed cartoons of the 
Prophet Muhammad. One of the cartoons showed the Prophet with a bomb in his turban. 
Alltogether there were 12 different drawings in the newspaper. According to Jyllands 
                                                 
11 “The Democratic Contradictions of Multiculturalism.” Eriksen & Stjernfelt, 2011, 329 
12“Bombing of Muslim school linked to murder of film-maker,” Castle, Stephen November 9, 2004. 





Postens cultural editor, Flemming Rose, “there is a long Danish tradition of biting satire 
with no taboos, and that Muhammad and Islam are being treated no differently to other 
religions or religious figures.”15 These drawings have sparked riots and violence by 
Muslims in Europe and around the world. Many Europeans contend that these drawings 
constitute free speech, and Muslims must tolerate these expressions when they live in a 
society with liberal views and values. This incident highlights the potential for violence 
due to conflicting values. As one article states on the BBC’s webpage, “In many 
European countries there is a sense of secular values being under fire from conservative 
Islamic traditions among immigrant communities. Many commentators see the cartoons 
as a response to this.  
D. 2008: ROSENGAARD IN SWEDEN. 
Rosengaard is a city district in Malmø, Sweden. Malmø faces challenges with its 
immigrant population which “occupies” the district city of Rosengaard. The Swedish 
police are afraid to enter the city. If immigrants need medical assistance, the ambulances 
demand police protection to enter this part of town. Swedes are no longer welcome there. 
In 2008, 86% of the population was of foreign background. “Malmö suffered from a 
significant shortage of cheap housing and when immigrants arrived in the 1960s and 
1970s they frequently were offered housing in Rosengaard. It was at this time (and, 
particularly in the late 70’s and 80’s) that many Swedish nationals left the area. In 1972, 
the percentage of immigrants leveled briefly at around 20% of the local population, in 
1998 this figure had risen to around 80%.”16  According to the official governmental 
statistical bureau, (SCB) over 70 percent of the children in Rosengaard are living in 
relative poverty. 
                                                 
15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4677976.stm, 14.May 2012 
16Landes, D. “Rosengård firefighters call it quits.” The Local. (Sweden’s News in 




E. 2011: THE BOMBING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE AND THE 
MASSACRE AT UTØYA, NORWAY. 
On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, a radical right-wing sympathizer, set 
off a fertilizer bomb in Oslo, collapsing the building holding the office of Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg (Labor Party), killing 8 people. He then proceeded to the Labor youth 
camp at Utøya where he massacred 69 persons, some as young as 14 years of age. His 
justification for this killing spree was the integration policy of the Norwegian government 
over the last 20 years, the failure of multiculturalism, and what he saw as an Islamic 
invasion of Europe. Recent statements in the European media indicate that Breivik is not 
completely alone in his extreme views. His actions reflect an increased willingness by 
right-wing nationalists to use violence to make their point publicly. Even if few 
Europeans support Breivik’s extreme actions and logic, right-wing political parties in 
Europe are on the rise. Such an increase in right-wing movements and political parties 
has not been seen in Europe since the mid-1930s when Nazism and Fascism were on the 
rise. This trend is polarizing political discourse, and it should concern Europeans. 
F. A THREAT TO POLITICAL ORDER 
In recent years the new radical right’s political discourse has struck a 
chord with voters across Europe and experienced a substantial increase in 
electoral support, allowing it to enter into coalition governments in 
Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark. In 1994 
Gianfranco Fini’s “post-fascist” National Alliance entered a coalition 
government presided over by Silvio Berlusconi in Italy. In 1998, in 
France, Jean Marine Le Pen, leader of the Front National, achieved a 
significant result in the French regional election and four years later 
obtained enough votes in the first round of the French election to become 
president of the Republic, had he won the second round. In 2000 Jörg 
Haider, then leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), joined a 
coalition government, and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the 
Netherlands, which according to recent polls is likely to become the 
second biggest party in the country, might achieve a similar position after 
the elections taking place in June (2010).17  
                                                 
17 Montserrat Guibernau, “Migration and the rise of the radical right,” Policy Network, www.policy-
network.net, March 2010 
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The increasing vigor of rightwing parties involves several factors; immigration 
and integration are two of the major factors. Montserrat Guibernau, a professor of politics 
at Queen Mary University of London and a visiting fellow at the Centre for Global 
Governance, London School of Economics examines the problem in her paper, 
“Migration and the rise of the radical right.”   
The most popular item in the new radical right’s political agenda concerns 
its opposition to immigrants. With the ongoing process of globalization, 
many European countries have experienced a sharp rise in the number of 
immigrants and outbreaks of hostility towards foreigners who are 
perceived as a threat to precarious jobs and livelihoods but also as posing 
a challenge to national cultures and identities. These developments have 
promoted the emergence of a unique and unsettling environment for some 
individuals unprepared, unable or unwilling, to adjust to a novel situation; 
individuals who regard the new radical right as an alternative to 
mainstream politics.18  
Recent elections in France, Holland, the Scandanavian countries and Greece 
support this statement. 
These cases exemplify a few of the ways in which immigration and failed 
integration policies can cause disorder in Europe. The governments in Europe don’t want 
immigration to be a source of political disorder and want to mitigate the turbulence 
immigration causes. There are also issues of integration - how much should the host 
society compromise to accommodate immigrant populations, and how much should 
immigrants integrate into the society they are making home? Governments in Europe 
therefore need to do a better job of integrating immigrants or they need to reduce/ prevent 
immigration alltogether. But to do so governments need to do a better job of collecting 
and measure what effects immigration and integration will have on society.  
Our contention in this thesis is that such data is scarce and not collected in a 
consistent way over time. This shortfall makes measuring integration difficult, which 
makes policies difficult to develop. We will thus suggest how this evaluation might be 
done, what data should be collected and why this is important. 
                                                 
18 Ibid  
 8 
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II. EUROPE TODAY 
A. EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 
The European Union (EU) represents a collection of democratic countries. People 
within their own country control the government through a system of free elections. As a 
collective Union, the EU provides a framework for members to address regional 
economic, political and security issues as a unified body. Since WWII, the European 
Union has evolved into a powerful economic force in the world. However, the strength of 
the EU is still fundamentally based on the strength and stability of its member nations 
and their willingness to support each other. Since the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the Union 
dealt with a number of economic crises that threatened the Union. A more serious threat 
to the Union is developing from non-EU immigration into Europe. 
Assuming citizens have a reasonably uniform set of values and expectations, 
democracy is a historically stable political institution. John Locke and Thomas Hobbes 
believed the fundamental requirement for a functioning political society was that each 
member of the society would relinquish his natural rights and powers and place them in 
the hands of the community. This community, represented by either a sovereign or 
elected assembly, is vested with the power to arbitrate disputes and protect the 
community in accordance within an established set of laws. Thus, the source of any 
government’s power resides in the willingness of the people to submit to the will of the 
sovereign or assembly appointed to adjudicate conflicts among community members. In 
his book From Dictatorship to Democracy, Gene Sharp writes that all sources of political 
power “depend on acceptance of the regime, on the submission and obedience of the 
population, and on the cooperation of innumerable people and the many institutions of 
the society.”19 According to Sharp, all governments are inherently vulnerable to the 
collective will of the population. So, regardless of the type of government, the key 
requirement for political order is the population’s willingness to submit to the decisions 
of the government.  
                                                 
19 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy, originally published in 1993 in Bangkok, reprinted 
2012  
 10 
The genius of democracy resides in the mechanism that enables the people to 
control the policy decisions and administration of the government. Of course, it is 
unrealistic to assume that the government meets every expectation or that society’s values 
and expectations are perfectly uniform. We assume that a certain percentage of 
unfulfilled expectations within society is to be expected and normal. However, if the 
values and expectations of the people sufficiently diverge, then no government policy can 
meet all groups’ needs. In such a case, one group will dominate the government and 
develop policy while the other group will reject not only the policy, but also the authority 
of the government and actively oppose it.  
Clearly, there must be significant divergences in values and expectations among 
citizens to reach a threshold where no government policy can achieve a compromise 
between opposing groups. This threshold is characterized by citizens who lose faith in the 
government to provide security, administer justice, or exercise the legitimate use of force. 
Citizens may then seek to change the government through force rather than via the 
democratic process. This sort of division in society is not only theoretically possible, but 
likely in the absence of proactive government policy to prevent or mitigate differences 
over sensitive issues. Acts of violence and rejection of government authority undermine 
the stability of each European government individually and the EU as a collective. 
B. IMMIGRATION THEORY 
“The European Union is and will continue to be a region of immigration.”20 As 
such, a brief summary of the immigration policy; its purpose, conditions, components, 
and methods of implementation follows. Existing immigration policy in all EU countries 
reflects the mainstream value that immigration, up to a certain level, is good for society.  
Immigration policy is based on economic and moral motives. Society accepts 
many immigrants based on their potential to provide economic benefits to society. Young 
educated immigrants and low-income labor immigrants both add to the labor market in 
society and represent an economic benefit. Other immigrants, such as refugees and 
asylum seekers, are accepted on moral grounds. In all cases, immigration policy is 
                                                 
20 Martiniello, Marco, “Towards a coherent approach to immigrant integration policy(ies) in the 
European Union,” www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/38295165.pdf 
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expected to generate a net non-negative impact on society. No rational government would 
intentionally implement an immigration policy that would harm its society.  
There are two components to immigration policy. The first component involves 
authorization regarding how many immigrants? from where? with what skill sets? etc. 
Establishing the proper rate of immigration requires a collective government decision 
based on motives and an enforcement mechanism to deny illegal immigration. While 
there may be widespread debate about the correct number of immigrants permissible or 
the types of immigrants desired, once decided, this component of policy can be clearly 
articulated, measured, and enforced.  
The second component of immigration policy involves the immigrant integration 
process. This component facilitates the immigrant inclusion in the social, political, 
economic, and cultural spheres of life in his/her new country. Each European country has 
recognized the need for an effective immigrant integration process. However, there is 
little agreement regarding the methods to achieve this integration or measure its success. 
In 2004, the EU adopted the Common Basic Principles (CBP) for Immigrant Integration 
Policy.21  This document is widely considered to be the cornerstone of European 
Immigration policy despite the fact that the concept of integration remains strictly 
undefined. The CBPs emphasize “respect for the basic values of the EU,” employment, 
native participation with immigrants, education, language training, religious freedoms, 
political participation, and a need to develop clear indicators for integration,22 but these 
principles do not define the characteristics of an “integrated immigrant.” Subsequently, 
each member state has enacted laws and enforced those regulations to improve its own 
integration process.   
Each European nation maintains ultimate responsibility for its immigration policy. 
However, individual states lost some immigration control mechanisms when the EU 
became a zone of open borders. The immigration policy of one country invariably 
impacts the rest of the EU. For example, many European nations fiercely criticized the 
                                                 
21 Council of the European Union, 2618th Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, Common 
Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration Policy, 14615/04, Brussels, 19 Nov 2004. 
22 Ibid. 
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Spanish government for adopting a policy of “normalization” toward illegal immigrants. 
This policy effectively granted more than a million immigrants European citizenship and 
authorized them to relocate throughout the EU. Likewise, a failure to integrate 
immigrants by one country creates collective problems for others. Immigrants without 
respect for EU values, language skills, or education will be isolated from the rest of 
society, regardless of their country of residence. Such isolation is inherently counter-
productive to integration, economic prosperity and societal participation.   
C. EUROPE’S RIGHT-WING 
At elections in Vienna in 2010, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) 
increased its share of the vote to more than 25 per cent and so continued 
its electoral resurgence. In fact, polling indicates that the party is now the 
most popular option for young Austrians. Meanwhile, regional elections in 
France saw the National Front (FN) bounce back from the 2007 
presidential elections to attract almost 12 per cent of the vote. Further 
north, the Sweden Democrats (SD) polled more than 5 per cent and 
entered the national parliament for the first time with 20 seats. In the 
Netherlands, support for the Party for Freedom (PVV) increased almost 
three-fold to 1.5 million votes, or 15.5 per cent of the vote.23  
The electoral success of the radical right reflects a growing rift in the political 
order of Europe.24 The main political issues attracting people to the radical right are 
grievances over immigration policy, and enforcement and integration processes.25. For 
example, the Austrian right-wing party calls for an end to all immigration and wants all 
foreigners and asylum-seekers who commit crimes expelled.26  
Tensions between locals, immigrants, and governments are rising in many 
European countries. “European societies are experiencing troubling tendencies, marked 
by the fragmentation of ethnically-mixed populations, the spread of extremist ideologies, 
a growing willingness among radicals to engage in violence, and the propensity of 
                                                 
23 “Europes Radical Right: Support and Potential.” Mark Goodwin, 
http://www.politicalinsightmagazine.com/? p=792 
24 Goodwin, 2011 
25 See for example Ford and Goodwin 2010, (Oesch 2008), (Dancygier mk, 2010) 
26 http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ 
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politicians to instrumentalize racial and ethnic anxieties for electoral purposes.”27 This 
latent discord is reflected by increased electoral support for the new radical right parties.  
A growing amount of the native European population view the growth of 
immigrant communities as a worrying prospect. They fear that the 
strengthening and growing size of these communities with a radical 
different set of values and culture, has the capacity to progressively 
transform traditional majority-minority relationships as migrants organize 
themselves politically, culturally and economically.28  
In some countries, where the radical right has less electoral support, it 
nevertheless contributes to the mainstreaming of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim ideas 
and discourse. This in turn helps create a broader climate conducive to radical right 
thinking.29 “Europe is riven by ethnic tensions and is fragmenting along multicultural 
lines. On the extremes, tragic violence is becoming familiar: Amsterdam, Utoya, 
Zwickau, Toulouse—and in the background, there is the “home-grown” terrorism of the 
bombings in London and Madrid. It is no wonder then that voters are looking for 
candidates who promise effective security measures and counter-terrorism policies.”30  
1. Radical Right Agenda 
In this section we will examine the radical right’s agenda, the reasons for its rise 
in support, and the implications for this shift on European governments. We will present 
statistics that show that radical right groups in the European political sphere have grown 
in numbers and political strength over the last ten years. This growth in popularity has 
transformed radical right parties from negligible minorities to considerable stakeholders 
in certain parliaments. 
In France, the right-wing populist party National Front (FN) has grown 
substantially in the past decade. In the 2007 presidential election, the FN leader, Le Pen, 
                                                 
27 “ Race and Violence the European Way,” Russell Berman, 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/115601 
28 Ibid, 11 
29“The new radical right: Violent and non-violent movements in Europe.” Goodwin, Ramalingan and 
Brigg, Institute for Strategic Dialouge, January 2012 
30 “ Race and Violence the European Way,” Russell Berman, 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/115601 
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received 10.44% of the votes. In the Parliamentary elections the same year, FN garnered 
4.29% of the votes. FN was then rated the fourth largest party in France. In the 2009 EU 
Parliamentary elections, FN received 6.34% of the votes and three seats in the EU 
Parliament. In the recent 2012 French presidential election, Le Pen’s daughter, Marine Le 
Pen the new FN leader, received 17.9% of the votes, roughly 10% behind Nicolas 
Sarkozy and the winner Francois Hollande. Additional, smaller extreme right-wing 
political parties in France received 2.86% of the votes in the 2007 parliamentary 
elections. In the 2009 EU elections, the same extreme groups received 11.19% of the 
votes.31  
Marine Le Pen, leader of the FN in France, warns about the growing number of 
immigrants. She demands social welfare systems for the French instead of for the 
immigrants. The National Front argues in favor of: stopping all immigration to France, 
revitalizing French nationality, applying the national preference principle, and protecting 
national identity.32 Party members are staunch advocates of “France for the French” 
principle and promote the complete transformation of immigrants into French citizens.33 
In Holland, a similar right-wing development can be seen. The killing of film 
director Theo van Gogh in 2004 challenged the Dutch population to take a stand on 
behalf of freedom of speech; the killing of van Gogh resulted in a spiral of violence that 
left churches and mosques in flames.34 In the 2003 Dutch Parliamentary elections, the 
right-wing party “Lijst Pim Fortuyn” (LPF) received 5.7% of the votes. LPF was the 
dominant right-wing party until Gert Wilders established the Party for Freedom (PVV), 
in 2005 with a strong anti-immigration agenda. The party believes Judeo-Christian and 
humanist traditions should be those dominant in the Netherlands, immigrants should 
                                                 
31 http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ 
32 “Migration and the rise of the radical right” ,” Montserrat Guibernau, Social malaise and the failure 
of mainstream politics, Policy Network, www.policy-network.net, 2010, 11  
33 Ibid, 12 
34 “The Democratic Contradictions of Multiculturalism.” Eriksen & Stjernfelt, 2011 
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adapt accordingly, and the government should halt immigration from non-Western 
countries.35  
The PVV has enjoyed a rise similar in popularity and membership as that of its 
ideological counterparts in France. Today, the PVV is the dominant right-wing party in 
Holland. Hence, the PVV election results can be used to track the popularity of Dutch 
right-wing parties. In the 2009 EU Parliamentary elections, PVV received 16.97% of the 
votes. In the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary elections, the PVV garnered 15.5% of the votes. 
The PVV had a setback in this year’s (2012) recent Dutch elections; it only managed to 
retain 15 seats, losing 9. But none-the-less, the PVV managed to influence Dutch politics 
and force a discussion about the problem that the rest of Europe is experiencing--
regarding growing concerns about immigrants and failed integration. “The PVV has had 
a profound effect on Dutch politics. Mainstream parties terrified of bleeding votes have 
taken many of its ideas on board. A recent minority government that was supported by 
the PVV adopted a ban on burkas, a ban on double citizenship and other anti-immigrant 
policies.”36 
France and Holland not only have two of the biggest right-wing parties in Europe, 
but the two countries also have some of Europe’s largest immigrant populations. Yet, the 
rise of right-wing politics is not unique to countries with a large immigrant population or 
with a colonial history and long immigrant traditions. Denmark and Austria have 
experienced the same rise in right-wing political parties. The Danish People’s Party, 
Denmark’s largest right-wing party, received 6.80% of the votes in the 2004 EU 
Parliament elections. In the 2005 Danish Parliament election, support for the party 
jumped to 13.25% of the votes, making it the third largest political party in Denmark. In 
the 2007 Danish Parliament elections the Danish People’s party received 13.86% of the 
votes. In the 2009 EU Parliament election, the party received 15.28% of the vote, an 
increase in 8.5% over the 2004 EU elections. No other party in Denmark had such a boost 
in electoral support. In the 2011 Danish Parliament election, the party experienced a 
minor dip back to 12.32%. Yet, overall the right-wing trend in Denmark remains strong 
                                                 
35 Freedom Party program, 2009 
36 http://www.economist.com/node/21560294, 09/19/2012 
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and the Danish People’s Party has established itself as one of the top three political 
parties.37 According to the 2011 Danish People’s Party’s political program, “Denmark is 
not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus, we will not accept transformation to 
a multi-ethnic society. Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live 
in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the lines of 
Danish culture.”38  
Austria has three right-wing populist parties: the “Alliance for the Future of 
Austria,” “The Freedomites in Carinthia,” and the “Freedom Party of Austria.” Since 
2000, the “Freedom Party of Austria” (FPO) has been in a coalition government with the 
Christian Democrats. The 2004 Presidential elections saw a voter turnout of 71.6%--an 
all-time low in the history of Austrian presidential elections. The FPO abstained from 
nominating any candidates in these elections. The Social Democrats candidate, Heinrich 
Fischer, won. In the 2004 EU Parliament elections, the FPO received 6.31% of the votes. 
In the 2006 Austrian Parliament elections, Jorg Haider’s party, “Alliance for the Future 
of Austria,” received 4.11% of the votes. The Alliance for the Future of Austria had a 
strong anti-immigration platform. It’s leader, Haider was previously a FPO politician, but 
internal differences led him to establish his own right-wing party. With a platform that 
called for expulsion of foreigners from Austria, the FPO received 11.04% of the vote in 
the 2005 elections. Together, these two right-wing parties received 15.15% of the total 
votes, constituting the third largest electoral block.  
The 2008 Austrian Parliament elections were the worst elections since World War 
II for the two largest Austrian political parties, the Social Democrats and the Austrian 
Peoples Party. Meanwhile, the two right-wing parties had their best elections ever. The 
Freedom Party received 17.54% of the votes and Haider’s party received 10.70%. Both 
parties campaigned to end immigration and called for the expulsion of foreigners and 
asylum-seekers who committed crimes.39 In the 2009 EU parliament elections, the 
                                                 
37 http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ 




Freedom Party received 12.71% of the votes, almost a 7% increase from the 2004 EU 
elections. Jorg Haider’s Alliance for the future of Austria party only received 4.58%. In 
the 2010 Austrian Presidential elections, the candidate representing the FPO, Barbara 
Rosenkranz, received almost 500,000 votes--15.24% of the total --placing her two out of 
three. Many believed that one of the two right-wing parties would then have to be invited 
into a new government, but the Social Democrats and the Austrian People’s Party refused 
to go into a coalition with either of the two right-wing parties. This rejection must have 
been disappointing to the right-wing voters who accounted for almost 20% of all the 
voters in Austria. 
Austria, with a population of almost 8.5 million (according to a 2011 estimate),  
5.5% of whom are foreigners, is a European country that has had a significant increase in 
the number of right-wing voters over the last 10 years. If this trend continues, it is likely 
that there will be a right-wing government or at least a new right-wing party in a coalition 
government in Austria in the future. Consequently, ignoring and rejecting the large 
number of right-wing voters in Austria will potentially have negative effects. For 
instance, these voters may be inclined to coalesce with others who have even more 
extreme right-wing views in order to create a block big enough to be recognized. 
Secondly, arrogance and ignorance about the views of a significant percentage of the 
electorate by mainstream political parties could lead to more forceful expressions of 
political will outside the voting booth, including protests and political violence. 
Governments ignore the new radical right’s electoral successes and its anti-
immigration policy to their peril. If mainstream parties don’t ignore right-wing messages 
outright, they demonize them and conflate them with old-style fascism.40  
Rather than analyzing the conditions which have brought about the 
emergence of the new radical right and seriously examining the reasons 
why their discourse is well received by significant sections of the public, 
the traditional parties of Europe seem more eager to delegitimize these 
parties and to rule them out as “respectable” political options. By 
emphasizing the “politically incorrect” and “un-presentable” discourse and 
ideology of the new radical right, mainstream parties have underestimated 
                                                 
40 “Migration and the rise of the radical right,” Montserrat Guibernau, 17 
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the extent to which their arguments resonate with the public and have 
tended to reject the possibility of these parties becoming real contenders 
for political power. Of course, such assumptions are beginning to change 
as new radical right parties have entered into coalition governments in 
various European countries, have gained a significant number of seats in 
the European Parliament, and are making progress at the local level in 
countries where they previously had no support, such as in the UK.41  
What, meanwhile constitutes a right-wing party? Right-wing parties lean toward 
extreme conservatism and anti-socialism, and promote extreme steps to achieve their 
anti-immigrant and anti-government views.42 The right-wing’s central objection to 
immigrants is the problems they cause society in terms of unemployment, reduced health 
services, a rise in crime statistics, etc.43  
Some researchers argue that Europe’s economic turbulence, and the recent crises 
in the Eurozone overshadow the factor responsible for the surge in popularity of right-
wing parties. But this view ignores the fact that the rise of radical right occurred during a 
period of unprecedented economic prosperity. In fact, we sould submit that this 
prevailing view purposely overlooks the structural factors explaining the new radical 
right’s success in many European countries.44 For instance, Kai Arzheimer, professor at 
political science from the University of Mainz and an expert on political extremism, 
writes in his article “Who votes for the Extreme Right and why and when?” that “Around 
the turn of the century, the view that immigration (usually operationalized by the number 
of refugees or asylum seekers applying or actually taking residence in a country) has a 
substantial positive effect on right-wing voting was firmly established, whereas the 
effects of inflation and of (aggregate) unemployment appeared to be much less 
consistent.”45 Several independent researchers support his findings.46  
                                                 
41 Ibid, 16–17 
42 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/extreme+right-winger, 08/05/2012 
43 “Rechtspopulismus in Europa. Vergängliches Phänomen oder auf dem Weg zum politischen 
Mainstream.” Bauer, T. Werner (2010): Internationale Politikanalyse, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin.  
44 Ibid, 16 
45 Arzheimer, K, “Who Votes for the Extreme Right and why – and when?” Electoral Sociology, 
Internet 08/05/2012, pg 1 
46 See for example: Guibernau 2010; Arzheimer 2009; Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000; 
Mudde 2007. 
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Others mistakenly attribute right-wing success to a collection of uneducated and 
unskilled voters in the population. Yet,  
While men were always overrepresented amongst the French Front 
National’s voters, it is well-documented that its electoral base has changed 
considerably over time. Initially, the Front appealed primarily to the petty 
bourgeois, but it quickly transformed itself into a non-traditional workers’ 
party. In between, it managed to attract occasional support from segments 
of the middle classes.47  
This means that radical right parties attract their support in the same way 
established parties do across various social boundaries. Moreover, what a deeper look at 
the FN reveals is that support for radical right parties is motivated by the same kind of 
ideological and pragmatic considerations as support for established parties.48 
The new radical right has captured popular concerns about the importance of 
maintaining Western values.49  “In a nation, people are born and socialized into a specific 
culture with its own language, customs and traditions capable of fostering a sense of 
belonging among those sharing a distinctive national identity. It follows that only those 
who belong can attain citizenship.”50 The right-wing parties in Europe have managed to 
obtain significant electoral support by presenting themselves as the defenders of this 
view, and draw on a growing group of conservative nationals who consider western 
European culture and values to be under threat.  
The new radical right defends the idea of a “fortress Europe,” which they 
argue is compatible with the protection of national cultures and identities 
as well as economic prosperity. It exploits the fears and anxieties of 
citizens who feel threatened by socio-economic changes and resent a rise 
in the number of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees entering their 
countries. For many citizens it is only when their national identity is 
threatened that they begin to take action to reclaim their sense of self-
esteem. For them, identification with the nation offers a source of pride, 
                                                 
47“Electoral Sociology: Who Votes for the Extreme Right and why – and when?” Arzheimer, 12 
48 “The support base of radical right parties in the enlarged European Union.” Van der Brug & 
Fennema, University Of Amsterdam, 2006, pg 3, See for example: Guibernau 2010; Arzheimer 2009; Van 
der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000; Mudde 2007. 
49 “Migration and the rise of the radical right,” Montserrat Guibernau, 12 
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which they do not experience as a result of supporting any of the 
mainstream parties.51  
Other observers suggest that these developments are not new and that the rise in 
the right-wing politics is more cyclical than anything else (e.g., one saw the same thing in 
the 1930’s, 1960s and 1980s). But these arguments fail to consider the differing causes of 
earlier right-wing movements. The rise of nationalism in the 1930’s was not a response to 
immigration, but rather a response to the Allied administration of post-WWI Europe. 
Right-wing movements of the 60’s and 80’s were a response to an existential threat 
during the Cold War rather than an internal threat. Further, even a cyclical rise in right-
wing political demands that specific cases be taken into account. Otherwise it is 
impossible to counter them and efforts to delegitimize radical right-wing proposals and 
ameliorate the grievances of right-wing constituencies remain unaddressed. 
D. A PATH FORWARD 
In some cases, latent tension between immigrants and European local populations 
has already erupted into violence. The founder of “Lijst Pim Fortuyn” (LPF), Dutch 
politician Pim Fortuyn, was assassinated during the 2002 Dutch electoral campaign by a 
Moroccan immigrant. Fortuyn’s assassination sparked further tension and support for the 
right-wing movement and led to the establishment of Gert Wilder’s “Freedom Party.” 
Tellingly, Pim Fortuyn’s main concern was not the protection of national identity, but the 
establishment of some kind of “welfare chauvinism” granting priority to Dutch nationals. 
This discourse was directed toward the democratic right advocating radical measures 
against immigration.52  
On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, a radical right-wing sympathizer, set 
of a fertilizer bomb in Oslo, collapsing the building holding the office of PM Jens 
Stoltenberg (Labor Party), killing eight people. He then proceeded to the Labor youth 
camp at Utøya where he massacred 69 more. Breivik’s attacks were the largest national 
tragedy in Norway since World War II. His justification for these actions was the failure 
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52 Montserrat Guibernau, “Migration and the rise of the radical right,” Social malaise and the failure of 
mainstream politics, Policy Network, www.policy-network.net, March 2010, 17 
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of multiculturalism and what he considered to be an Islamic invasion of Europe. 
Essentially, the Norwegian government’s integration policies had failed. Even if 
Breivik’s actions are totally beyond reason, no one would think of openly supporting 
him, many European right-wing sympathizers do support his “political view” about how 
Europe is being effected by immigrants.  
The rise of right-wing parties should concern Europe as a whole. Even if the 
differences in their political platforms are large, there are certain issues of common 
agreement that appeal to a large nationalistic population. Economic tensions in the 
Eurozone are fueling anti-immigration attitudes and criticism of the government’s 
policies and laws regarding them. Still, the main concern is the number of immigrants 
entering Europe and the threat immigrants pose to existing national cultures and 
traditions. In many countries, the right-wing parties have been neglected, ignored and in 
some cases not taken seriously enough. Consequently, their members are offended by the 
dismissal of their ideas by mainstream political parties and leaders. If these people and 
their ideas are not acknowledged as legitimate in public discourse, some of these voters 
will move further right and will use violent means to gain the attention they believe they 
and their issues deserve. Herein lies the profound threat that poor immigration and 
integration policy possess to western European governments. 
 Failure to address the roots of this problem might, in some countries or regions, 
lead to internal violence and unstable democracies. Two main methods to counter the 
advancement and growth of right-wing parties and sentiments include establishing good, 
enforceable immigration policies and executing successful integration of immigrants. 
One of the first steps toward achieving these objectives is evaluating the performance of 
government in these areas. In the next chapter we will discuss the techniques and 
statistics currently used to evaluate government performance; we will offer an analysis of 
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III. DATA ANALYSIS 
 The rise of right-wing parties suggests that current immigration policies across 
Europe are negatively impacting society and therefore violating the principle requirement 
of immigration policy. At the extreme of the right-wing, proponents suggest immigration 
should be abolished completely. However, existence of immigration policy clearly 
demonstrates a mainstream desire to permit immigration in the proper amounts. Given 
that the preponderance of criticism from the right-wing targets legal immigration policy, 
we will assume that enforcement of legal immigration requirements is not the central 
source of conflict. Rather, the growing divisions in European society are a function of 
both the number of immigrants granted entry and poor integration of those immigrants. 
Our analysis will seek to explain: How serious is this division in society?  Is the right-
wing right?  If so, what should be the consequences? For instance, what policy 
adjustments are needed to address new concerns and/or reduce divisions over this issue?  
A. ANALYSIS 
 This section analyzes the data available on immigration flows into and out of 
Europe and the quality of immigrant integration. 
B. IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION VOLUME ON INTEGRATION EFFORTS: 
First, we evaluated the volume of immigrants, the first component of immigration 
policy. We obtained data from the OECD Migration Outlook reports. This data is plotted 
from 2000–2010. One can immediately see that there is a significant difference in the 
volume of immigrants accepted each year by each country. Europe’s larger economies 
accept more immigrants than smaller economies. Second, though it may be obscured due 
to the scale of the chart, each nation is increasing its immigrant acceptance rate. Given 
this data, we split the group of 12 nations into two groups (high and low volume 
immigration nations). High volume nations include: Germany, Spain, Italy, and the UK. 
Each of these nations accepts more than 200,000 immigrants per year. Low volume 
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nations include: France, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands. Each of these nations accepts fewer than 200,000 immigrants per year. 
 
Figure 1.  Immigration Volume in Europe 
The volume of immigrants cannot be considered a critical variable in successful 
integration. Eight of the twelve countries evaluated accepted fewer than 200,000 
immigrants per year since 2000. Of those countries, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Holland, 
and Austria reported poor integration performance similar to the performance of 
countries accepting large volumes of immigrants such as Germany, Spain, and Italy. It 
should also be noted that the UK, the country which accepted the second highest volume 
of immigrants over this time period, is also one of the most integrated societies in 
Europe. This data suggests strongly that controlling the volume of immigration may be 
less critical than administering an effective integration program. 
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C. INTEGRATION DATA 
 Data on integration is scarce.  “There is a widely acknowledged lack of 
comparable statistics on immigrant immigration.”53  Our review of the literature found 
only one study which objectively collected and compared integration indicators within 
Europe. We selected the twelve European countries to study: Austria, United Kingdom, 
Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Germany, and Portugal. 
These countries were selected because they represent a majority of the European Union 
countries into which immigrants are moving. They have a variety of historical 
backgrounds from colonialism to imperialism to communism and include founding 
members of the EU. 
D. DATA SOURCES 
In June 2010, the EU approved a pilot study to “examine proposals for common 
integration indicators and to report on the availability and quality of the data from agreed 
harmonized sources necessary for the calculation of these indicators.”54 Eurostat 
collected the initial study data from 2009 records and published its pilot study report in 
2011.55 After an exhaustive search of the literature, we found no other similar study. 
Since only 2009 data is reported, further analysis over time remains limited. The 
2011 pilot study collected data in four areas--employment, education, social inclusion, 
and active citizenship. The report compares each government’s performance against each 
indicator. Table 1 presents the integration indicators used from the 2011 pilot study. Each 
of these indicators is presented as a percentage point difference between the total 
population and the immigrant group. For example, in Austria unemployment is reported 
as “-7.”  This record can be interpreted as “The immigrants in Austria trail the total 
population unemployment rate by 7 points.”  So, while unemployment for the total 
Austrian population is 4%, immigrants in Austria are averaging 11% unemployment. The 
separation between the local population and the immigrants is reported directly.  
                                                 
53 Martiniello, M., p. 8 
54 Eurostat, Indicators of Immigrant Integration: A Pilot Study, 2011 
55 Ibid. 
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Our analysis re-organizes the data to illustrate the status of integration in each 
country in each of the four areas listed above. The following charts yield some insights 
into which integration policies have been effective and where policy and resource 
adjustments may be needed.  
 
Table 1.   Integration Indicators56 
  
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
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E. AUSTRIA  
 
 
Figure 2.  Austria Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population. 
2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total 
population 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 20% points behind the total population 
in reading, math, and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 29% more low-
achieving 15 year olds than does the native population. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 25% less than that found in the 
native population and the risk of poverty is 15% greater than that found in the total 
population. 





Figure 3.  Denmark Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every 
indicator except self employment. 
2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total 
population. 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 15% points behind the total population 
in reading, math, and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 16% more low-
achieving 15 year olds than does the total population. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 23% less than that found in the 
native population and the risk of poverty is 17% greater than that found in the total 
population. 






Figure 4.  Finland Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every 
indicator except self-employment. 
2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total 
population. Unemployment among immigrants is 9% greater among immigrants than the 
total population 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 15% points behind the total population 
in reading and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 18% more low-
achieving 15 year olds than does the total population. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 32% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 24% greater than that found in the total population. 






Figure 5.  France Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every 
indicator except self-employment. 
2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total 
population. Unemployment among immigrants is 8% greater among immigrants than 
total population. 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 14% points behind the total population 
in reading, math and science. In reading and math, the immigrant population has 15% 
more low-achieving 15 year olds than does the total population. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 25% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 21% greater than that found in the total population. 







Figure 6.  Germany Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every 
indicator. 
2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total 
population. Unemployment among immigrants is 7% greater among immigrants than 
total population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 14% higher than the rate 
for total population. 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 12% points behind the total population 
in reading, math and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 15% more low-
achieving 15 year olds than the total population. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 21% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 8% greater than that found in the total population. 











1) Unemployment among immigrants is 6% greater than in the total population.  
2) In education, immigrant children are less than 5 percentage points behind the total 
population in reading, math and science. 
3) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 20% less than that found in the total 
population. 






Figure 8.  Italy Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population. 
2) The first three economic indicators show better than average integration, but the fourth 
indicator reflects that immigrants have a 41% higher over-qualification rate. So, on 
average, immigrants are finding employment, but their jobs are not commensurate with 
their education or training. 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 20 percentage points behind the total 
population in reading, math and science. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 29% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 13% greater than that found in the total population. 







Figure 9.  Netherlands Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population. 
2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 4% behind the total 
population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 11% higher then the rate for 
total population. 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 12 percentage points behind the total 
population in reading, math and science. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 13% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 18% greater than that found in the total population. 






Figure 10.  Portugal Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) The economic indicators show that immigrants are reasonably well integrated. 
Unemployment among immigrants is only 4% greater than among immigrants the total 
population, though the over-qualification rate for immigrants is 20% higher than the rate 
of the total population.  
2) In education, immigrant children are within 5% of the total population, and immigrants 
show a higher rate of higher education. 






Figure 11.  Spain Integration Indicators  
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Observations: 
1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every 
indicator except activity rate. 
2) Two key economic indicators show that immigrants lag behind the total population. 
Unemployment among immigrants is 11% greater than among the total population. The 
over-qualification rate for immigrants is 25% higher than the rate for the total population. 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 19 percentage points behind the total 
population in reading, math and science.  
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 23% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 14% greater than that found in the total population. 









1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every 
indicator except self-employment. 
2) All economic indicators show that immigrants lag more than 10% behind the total 
population. Unemployment is 11% greater among immigrants than that found among the 
total population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 23% higher than the rate 
for the total population. 
3) In education, immigrant children are more than 20 percentage points behind the total 
population in reading, math and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 22% 
more low-achieving 15 year olds than does the total population. 
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 21% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 24% greater. 










1) All economic indicators show that immigrants lag behind the total population. 
Unemployment among immigrants is 3% greater among immigrants than among the total 
population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 9% higher than the rate for total 
population. 
3) In education, immigrant children are 5–10 percentage points behind the total 
population in reading, math and science.  
4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 19% less than that found in the total 
population and the risk of poverty is 12% greater than that found in the total population. 




Q. INTEGRATION OBSERVATIONS 
First, the indicators only measure immigrant participation in two of the four 
spheres of participation envisioned by the EU--social and economic. The Eurostat 
indicators fail to measure progress in the cultural and political spheres of society. 
Second, if successful integration is defined as suggested by “similar participation 
patterns as non-immigrant citizens,”57 as suggested by Marco Martiniello, then all 
countries with any substantial level of immigration are failing. Even Ireland, with the 
lowest rate of immigration among evaluated countries, is failing to integrate immigrants 
successfully. Immigrants lag behind the total population in employment, education, and 
social inclusion. Since this data set is limited to 2009, we can only conclude that policies 
and processes up until 2009 were not effective in integrating immigrants at the rate of 
immigration. The impact of any policy changes since then cannot be measured or 
evaluated. 
Third, the data suggests several trends. In all countries evaluated, unemployment 
was between three and eleven percentage points higher for the immigrant population than 
the total population. In all countries evaluated, the over-qualification rate for immigrants 
was an average of 16 percentage points higher than that for the total population. 
Immigrant children were behind their peers in reading, math, and science. In all 
countries, the median disposable income for immigrants was less than the median 
disposable income of the total population. In nine of the 12 countries evaluated, the 
difference in median disposable income was more than 20%.  
Fourth, the data suggests that education, employment, and disposable income are 
not directly correlated. For example, in Ireland, immigrants were 16 points ahead of the 
total population in completing tertiary education and 20 points ahead in primary 
education, but immigrants were three points behind in unemployment and had 20% less 
disposable income. A similar trend existed in the UK where immigrants were one point 
ahead in tertiary education and four points ahead in primary education, but immigrants 
were three points behind in unemployment and had 19% less disposable income.  
                                                 
57 Martiniello, p.9 
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Fifth, across Europe, immigrant children consistently underperformed in reading. 
This disparity suggests that immigrant children will have lower literacy rates, less overall 
education, reduced employment opportunities, and therefore lower incomes and higher 
poverty rates. While no integration indicator is singularly responsible for success or 
failure of integration, most observers would probably agree that improving young 
immigrant education would have a lasting positive impact on immigrant communities and 
society overall. 
Given that we only have figures up till 2009, further conclusions about the 
relative importance of each factor are not possible. Similar data over time is needed to 
identify key indicators of integration and their corresponding impacts on levels of 
political violence, crime, GDP, inflation, etc. 
R. IS THE RIGHT-WING MOVEMENT CORRECT? 
If proponents of right-wing movements are correct, then there ought to be a 
measurable negative impact on society from immigrants and the failure of government to 
successfully integrate them. In conducting research for this thesis, we found no causal 
link between immigration and political order. However, we cannot rule out such a link 
either. The rise of right-wing parties and the polarization of Europe remain real and 
represent a source of serious division and divisiveness within many countries in Europe.  
Many European countries are beset by problems with their immigration policy. 
Our concern is not with the state of the immigrants or the total population per se, but 
rather with the maintenance of a functional democracy in an environment of rapid 
population change and subsequent changes in values. Failure to maintain this functional 
democracy could potentially result in dangerous and economically devastating political 
disorder, to include violent protests, riots, and even civil war. While the data presented 
above indicate no definitive correlation between political order and immigration 
integration in Europe, the concern remains: if increased immigrant populations appear to 
threaten people’s sense of social or cultural identity, the ramifications may affect the 
economic and political spheres of life next. Political unrest can only be withstood by 
aloof governments for so long. 
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IV. ROAD MAP TO MEASURE INTEGRATION 
To measure integration or the lack of integration requires that consistent and 
coherent longitudinal data be collected according to consistent standards by governmental 
institutions. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the rise of right-wing parties is a European 
wide challenge. Immigration and integration should be evaluated in Europe as a whole, 
not by individual countries. 
As the Zaragoza pilot study indicates there are ways to effectively and coherently 
measure integration. The challenge in Europe is to establish a methodology to evaluate 
integration whereby each country can be measured against the same standard. “Member 
States differ in relation to the different views, goals and regulatory frameworks of 
integration policies in the respective Member States.”58 Without proper data, the success 
of immigration and integration is difficult to measure. The Zaragoza Study is a good 
starting point from which to collect data over time. This data would illuminate problems 
with current immigration and integration policy and funding. Having established the 
policy shortfalls, the data would point to areas requiring policy adjustment to achieve 
integration goals. Further, precise, deliberate measurements of integration can be 
published to inform the public about government policy effectiveness or lack thereof. 
Published reports would provide, the public has an alternative means by which to 
evaluate societal problems as opposed to emotionally reacting out of fear and 
misperception.   
So, what might be the criteria most useful for measuring integration? 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1) Continue collection and reporting of the data indicators gathered during the 
2009 pilot study on integration indicators. This report is the only publicly accessible  
source for integration indicators in Europe. Continued collection of this data over time is 
                                                 
58  
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crucial for evaluating the impact of policy changes and for guiding future policy 
decisions. 
2) Measure integration in four domains: Political, Cultural, Social, and Economic 
1. Political Domain: 
Voter Registration. This indicator reflects immigrants’ understanding of the 
democratic process and the role of individuals as participants (e.g., as voters) 
Voter Activity:  This indicator reflects active participation in elections, and 
reflects whether immigrants are willing to express their political will at the voting booth.   
Government Participation: This indicator reflects immigrants’ participation in 
civil discourse. Are immigrants working as government employees or elected officials? 
Immigrant participation in government reflects investment by immigrants in working to 
build a better community for all citizens. 
2. Cultural Domain: 
Language:  Knowing the native language is the basis for communicating and 
understanding national laws, rules, regulations, rights of citizens, and methods of 
peaceful resolution. Good communication skills are critical for success in the 
marketplace. Beyond knowing the spoken language, this indicator should also measure 
literacy rates.  
Education: In order for immigrants to be integrated across the workforce, 
immigrants should have education levels similar to those of the rest of the population. 
Education typically permits immigrants to obtain their desired level of employment based 
on their skills. Additionally, measuring education rates should point to future social, 
economic and political trends. 
Native Acceptance:  The first Common Basic Principle (CBP) of integration is 
that immigration is a 2-way process of accommodation between the population at large 
and immigrants. Hence, a regularly measuring of the native acceptance of immigrants is 
needed. We propose as one measure the intermarriage rate between native born citizens 
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and foreign-born first generation immigrants. This would be one indicator of broad 
acceptance of immigrant culture by the local population. 
3. Social Domain: 
Crime: This indicator reflects immigrant respect for the rule of law in the country. 
It also reflects respect for national values. Statistics for crime should be readily available. 
In a well-integrated society, crime rates for immigrants should be similar to crime rates 
those rates for the population as a whole. 
Median Income: This measure gauges the level of equality in economic 
opportunity across communities.   
Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion: This indicator reveals discrimination by the 
population against immigrants by measuring levels or acceptance by the total population 
economically and culturally.   
4. Economic Domain: 
Unemployment:  This indicator reflects immigrant participation in the economy, 
native acceptance of immigrants in the marketplace, equality in job training received, and 
availability of employment opportunities. Employment is fundamental to participation in 
society. 
Over-Qualification rate: This indicator measures equality and respect from the 
total population. A high over-qualification rate suggests a low degree of respect by the 
total population and an unwillingness to hire or trust immigrants. Alternatively it can 
sometimes reveal that highly educated immigrants have low communication skills. 
Means of redress are considerably different in both cases. 
Public Assistance: It is vital to record the percentage of immigrants accepting 
welfare, especially since this is usually a flashpoint political issue. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Current immigration policy assumes incorrectly that all immigrants want to 
integrate into Europe and adopt European values. To maintain aspects of identity many 
Europeans consider critical and even fundamental, and to prevent the rise of right-wing 
extremism, immigration and integration policy must be adjusted to inform immigrants 
that to settle in Europe they need to integrate and to clearly define that standard. 
Countries should consider developing consequences for immigrants who fail to integrate 
within an established timeframe. 
Some immigrants are entering Europe with values diametrically opposed to 
European values. European values are very permissive of those from other cultures, but 
new immigrants must follow the laws of the country to which they are emigrating. Nor is 
the integration problem necessarily limited to first generation immigrants. To prevent 
further self-segregation, for instance, a well-constructed, measurable integration process 
must be put in place to inform immigrants about the law, citizens rights, and the values 
that are important to the host nation. 
Divided societies have the potential to threaten the stability of European 
democracies. If the values of two groups within a democracy diverge to the point where 
government policy cannot satisfy both groups, there may be conflict. Integration does not 
require that immigrants change their identities, but rather its goal is to get people to adopt 
the values of their new nation. 
Integration must be a priority task for every government in Europe. People react 
emotionally to issues associated with immigrants. Fear of the unknown remains a 
powerful obstacle to successfully integrating new immigrants. Governments do not want 
immigration to be a source of political disorder. They also want to mitigate the turbulence 
immigration causes. Yet this is impossible to do wihout addressing immigrants as a 
potential source of political dissent. The only viable course of action to prevent further 
politicization of immigration as an issue is to focus more resources and attention on 
integrations effects. 
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Failure to assess and correct shortfalls in immigrant integration policy 
performance may produce several negative results. First, there is the likelihood society 
will become divided along racial and/or socio-economic lines. Immigrants will likely 
band together for economic, social, and security reasons, further insulating themselves 
from the country and natives with whom they need to integrate. Natives will similarly 
band. Corollary to this, one must assume that a divided society in which people have 
opposing values will generate more conflict between immigrants and natives. 
The size of the immigrant group is also a key factor. All other things being equal, 
larger immigrant groups are harder to integrate than smaller groups. They are more prone 
to isolate themselves because their group is large enough not to have to interact with 
natives. This process becomes self-reinforcing because it reduces the inclination of 
follow on waves of immigrants to have to integrate. Immigrants who do not learn the 
national language will create further communication barriers between themselves and 
native society. Worse, once different standards are allowed, they will displace native 
standards and cause immigrants to further insulate themselves from the host country 
population. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The rate of integration should exceed the rate of immigration. Any policy which 
permits a flow of immigrants without properly integrating them is likely to lead to 
segregated immigrants and negative impacts on native citizens. In the long-run, taking a 
measured integration approach is the only sustainable immigration strategy for enduring 
political order. 
Integration policy and procedures should be developed country by country. Every 
country has unique cultural and economic circumstances. Each country is best suited to 
determine the most efficient, most effective methods by which to integrate new 
immigrants. 
Integration performance should be measured consistently according to a common 
set of integration indicators established by the EU. If the mainstream perception is that 
immigration is a problem, then even if it is not, that’s a problem. Carefully measured 
 59 
statistics over time of certain integration indicators will provide a valuable measurement 
tool for evaluating integration performance and re-adjusting policies. Integration should 
be measured as equal participation by the immigrants in the political, economic, social, 
and cultural domains in the host country. The Zaragoza study from 2011 offers an 
excellent first step in the right direction. It now needs to be extended. 
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